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TRIBAL LENDING AFTER GINGRAS  
MAX KING† 
ABSTRACT 
Online payday lenders pose serious risks for consumers. Yet, 
for years, these lending companies have skirted state regulation 
by pleading tribal sovereign immunity. Under this doctrine, 
entities that are so affiliated with tribal nations that they are “an 
arm of the tribe” are immune from suit. Without comprehensive 
federal regulation, tribal sovereign immunity has served as a 
trump card at the pleading state for online payday lenders.  
The Note argues that change may be on the horizon. In the 
recent decision Gingras v. Think Finance, the Second Circuit 
held that the Supreme Court’s holding in Michigan v. Bay Mills 
Indian Community permitted injunctive suits against tribal 
affiliates, acting in their official capacity off reservation, based 
on state law. If other courts adopt the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning, states and consumers will be far better equipped to 
tackle online payday lenders.  
INTRODUCTION 
Proudly displayed on the website of online payday lending 
company, Big Picture Loans,1 is short history of Michigan’s Chippewa 
Tribe.2 The timeline labeled “Our History” begins in the 1600s, when the 
Chippewas “achiev[ed] sustainability through fishing, hunting, and 
gathering natural foods.” Three panels later, the timeline explains that the 
Tribe now lives on a reservation in Watersmeet, Michigan, where it 
“strives to preserve the integrity of this land for future generations to 
enjoy.”3 Below the timeline, in a section titled “Our Business,” the page 
says that the Chippewas formed Big Picture Loans to “enhance the Tribe’s 
 
† Duke University School of Law, J.D. expected May 2021. 
1 About Us, BIG PICTURE LOANS, http://www.bigpictureloans.com/about-us (last 
visited Apr. 2, 2021).  
2 The Chippewa are members of the Michigan Anishinaabe tribes. “Anishinaabe” 
is the singular version of the name that the Chippewa (Ojibwe), Ottawa (Odawa), 
and Potawatomi (Bodewadomi) Nations of the Great Lakes use to refer to 
themselves. “Anishinaabe” means “original people.” See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, 
Race and American Indian Tribal Nationhood, 11 WYO. L. REV. 296, 297 n. 8 
(2011). See generally MATTHEW L.M. FLETCHER, THE EAGLE RETURNS: THE 
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE GRAND TRAVERSE BAND OF OTTAWA AND CHIPPEWA 
INDIANS (2012).  
3 Id.  
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self-determination and further diversify the Tribe’s economy.”4 The 
section further informs readers that the lending company “is an economic 
arm and instrumentality of the Tribe,” and “is organized and licensed 
under Tribal law and is located on the Tribe’s reservation.”5 
What the section does not explain is that “arm of the Tribe” is a 
legal term of art. Native American tribes enjoy tribal sovereign immunity 
unless Congress authorizes suit against them or the tribe waives its 
immunity.6 Some federal circuit courts and state supreme courts have 
adopted “arm of the tribe” tests to determine whether tribal sovereign 
immunity protects commercial entities associated with Native American 
tribes.7 Generally speaking, if a commercial entity is so closely affiliated 
with a Native American tribe that they are an “arm of the tribe,” and 
granting the immunity will promote the tribe’s economic development, the 
commercial entity will be immune from suit.8 That means that Big Picture 
Loans is not simply describing its relationship with the Chippewa Tribe; 
it is asserting that the relationship shields it from legal culpability.  
Big Picture Loans is not unique in this respect. Many online 
payday lender companies use tribal affiliations to benefit from tribal 
sovereign immunity.9 This Note will describe these companies’ 
problematic lending practices, discuss how they have partnered with 
Native American tribes, and detail the legal doctrines granting these 
companies immunity. This Note will also summarize state and federal 
attempts to regulate online payday lenders. Tribal immunity has stymied 
many state efforts,10 and the federal government has not yet taken 
comprehensive measures in this area. However, a recent Second Circuit 
decision, Gingras v. Think Finance, Inc.,11 may chart a new path forward. 




6 Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Techs., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998).  
7 See, e.g., Breakthrough Mgmt. v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort, 629 F.3d 
1173, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010); Williams v. Big Picture Loans, LLC, 929 F.3d 170, 
177 (4th Cir. 2019); White v. Univ. of Cal., 765 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2014); 
People v. Miami Nation Enters., 386 P.3d 357, 365–66 (Cal. 2016); Cash Advance 
& Preferred Cash Loans v. Colo. ex rel. Suthers, 242 P.3d 1099, 1110 (Colo. 
2010); Runyon v. Ass’n of Vill. Council Presidents, 84 P.3d 437, 439–40 (Alaska 
2004).  
8 See, e.g., Breakthrough, 629 F.3d at 1188. 
9 See generally Heather L. Petrovich, Commentary, Circumventing State 
Consumer Protection Laws: Tribal Immunity and Internet Payday Lending, 91 
N.C. L. REV. 326 (2012) (detailing sovereign immunity claims made by online 
payday lenders). 
10 Id. at 328. 
11 Gingras v. Think Fin., Inc., 922 F.3d 112 (2nd Cir. 2019).  
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Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Community12 permitted injunctive suits 
against tribal affiliates, acting in their official capacity off reservation, 
based on state law.13 Should other courts adopt the Second Circuit’s 
reasoning, states and consumers will be far better equipped to reign in 
online payday lenders.    
I. ONLINE PAYDAY LENDERS AND TRIBES 
 Payday loans harm consumers by ensnaring them in “debt traps,” 
wherein they are forced to take out multiple loans they cannot pay back in 
order to cover existing obligations. These debt traps are the key source of 
profit for payday lenders. This Part explains what payday loans are, why 
they are profitable, and how they harm consumers. Additionally, this 
section will describe how Internet payday lending companies partner with 
Native American tribes to circumvent regulation. These “rent-a-tribe” 
schemes grant companies sufficient connection with a Native American 
tribe for them to benefit from the tribe’s sovereign immunity. In the best 
version of the model, the affiliated tribe will receive investment capital, 
jobs for tribe members, and a share of the profits from the business in 
return. How often this truly happens, though, is questionable.  
A. What are Payday Loans? 
 Payday loans are high-cost, short-term credit arrangements, 
typically offered on 14-day repayment terms.14 Internet lender companies 
distribute these loans through their websites, often advertising the speed 
and simplicity of their application processes.15 Borrowers fill out 
application forms on lenders’ websites, disclosing their names, addresses, 
phone numbers, Social Security information, employment information and 
income, and checking account information.16 Borrowers are also required 
to write postdated checks for the amount they owe plus interest.17 The 
lender will hold the check until the borrower’s next payday, hence the 
name “Payday Loan.”18 When the loan is due, the borrower can redeem 
 
12 Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782 (2014).  
13 Gingras, 922 F.3d at 121. 
14 Lauren K. Saunders et al., Stopping the Payday Loan Trap, NAT’L CONSUMER 
L. CTR 4 (2010), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/high_cost_small_loans/ 
payday_loans/report-stopping-payday-trap.pdf. 
15 See, e.g., CHECK CITY, https://www.checkcity.com/services/payday-loans/ (last 
visited Mar. 12, 2020) (“[W]ith a fast, convenient payday loan from Check City 
you won’t have to worry. A payday loan is has [sic] a quick application process, 
is surprisingly easy to qualify for, and it’s incredibly affordable.”). 
16 See, e.g., PAYDAY CHAMPION, https://www.paydaychampion.com/online-
application/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2020).  
17 Saunders et al., supra note 14. 
18 Id. 
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the check, allow it to be deposited, or pay a finance charge and roll the 
loan over to the new pay period at a new fee.19 Many consumers with bad 
credit scores find these services attractive because they can procure the 
loan quickly and easily ,20 even though pay day loans’ Annual Percentage 
Rates (APRs) range from 391% to 789%.21 
 Hardly anything else is attractive about these loan services, 
however. While traditional lenders check that borrowers will be able to 
pay their loans back before disbursing funds,22 payday lenders do not.23 
Instead, payday lenders solicit consumers who likely cannot pay back their 
loans and will thus opt to roll their loans over to a new pay period with 
even higher fees. Even though many online payday lenders advertise their 
loans as short-term commitments, people who use payday lenders end up 
taking out an average of eight to nine loans annually.24 Lenders’ business 
model, in fact, depends on these customers returning for new loans. 
Borrowers who take out five or more loans a year generate ninety percent 
of the industry’s business; borrowers who take out twelve or more loans a 
year generate sixty percent of their business.25 To be sure, a study by the 
Center for Responsible Lending found that seventy-six percent of payday 
loans are taken out to pay back prior payday loans.26 This loan churning 
results in an extra $3.5 billion in fees annually.27 As borrowers take out 
 
19 Id. 
20 See An Update on Emerging Issues in Banking (Jan. 29, 2003), 
https://www.fdic.gov/bank/analytical/fyi/012903fyi.pdf; see also PAY DAY ME, 
https://www.paydayme.com/how-it-works/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2020). 
21 Saunders et al., supra note 14, at 4.  
22 Petrovich, supra note 9, at 326.  
23 Saunders et al., supra note 14, at 4. 
24 Uriah King & Leslie Parish, Springing the Debt Trap: Rate Caps are Only 
Proven Payday Lending Reform, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 8 (Dec. 13, 
2007), https://www.responsiblelending.org/sites/default/files/nodes/files/ 
research-publication/springing-the-debt-trap.pdf. 
25 Id. at 9.  
26 Uriah King & Leslie Parish, Phantom Demand: Short-Term Due Date 
Generates Need for Repeat Payday Loans, Accounting for 76% of Total Volume, 
CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 11 (July 9, 2009),  
https://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/research-analysis/phantom-
demand-final.pdf. 
27 Susanne Montezemolo, The State of Lending in America & Its Impact on U.S. 
Households, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 3 (Sept. 2013),  
https://www.responsiblelending.org/state-of-lending/reports/10-Payday-
Loans.pdf. 
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more and more money, the attending fees also increase, leaving borrowers 
stuck in “debt traps.”28 
 Debt traps pose serious consequences for borrowers. Studies have 
found that people who take out payday loans are more likely to file for 
bankruptcy29 and become delinquent on their credit card payments.30 
Borrowers are more likely to pay other bills late, delay their medical care 
and prescription drug purchases,31 and lose their bank accounts because of 
excessive overdrafts.32 Another study found that over half of borrowers 
default on their payday loans within one year.33 Most payday loan 
borrowers are teetering on the edge of the middle-class,34 meaning that 
debt traps can easily send them into poverty.  
B. “Rent-a-Tribe” Schemes  
 Native American communities are struggling economically. The 
U.S. Census Bureau found that 27% of Native Americans lived in poverty, 
the highest poverty rate of any racial group.35 In 2000, Native Americans’ 
median wealth was equal to only 8.7 percent of the median wealth among 
all Americans.36 This may be partially attributable to Native Americans’ 
low home ownership rate and home values, both of which are dwarfed by 
 
28 See Saunders et al., supra note 14; see also King & Parish, supra note 26. The 
“debt trap” describes when a consumer takes out a loan that she cannot pay back 
with her income and is, as a result, forced to take out more loans to pay the old 
ones. These new loans create new debt obligations she cannot repay, which then 
forces her to take out even more loans. This cycle continues until the consumer is 
“trapped” in debt. 
29 Paige Marta Skiba & Jeremy Tobacman, Do Payday Loans Cause Bankruptcy?, 
62 J. L. & ECON. 485, 485 (2019). 
30 Sumit Argawal et al., Payday Loans and Credit Cards: New Liquidity and 
Credit Scoring Puzzles?, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 412, 412 (2009). 
31 Brian T. Melzer, The Real Costs of Credit Access: Evidence from the Payday 
Lending Market, 126 Q. J. ECON. 517, 550 (2011). 
32 Dennis Campbell et al., Bouncing out of the Banking System: An Empirical 
Analysis of Involuntary Bank Account Closures, 36 J. BANKING & FIN. 1224, 1225 
(2012). 
33 Paige Martin Skiba & Jeremy Tobacaman, Payday Loans, Uncertainty, and 
Discounting: Explaining Patterns of Borrowing, Repayment, and Default, at 1 
(Vand. Sch. of L., L. & Econ. Res. Paper Series, Ser. No. 08-33, 2008). 
34 King & Parish, supra note 26, at 16. 
35 Suzanne Macartney et al., Poverty Rates for Selected Detailed Race and 
Hispanic Groups by State and Place: 2007-2011, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU 2 (Feb. 
2013), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2013/acs/acsbr11-17.pdf. 
36 Algernon Austin, Native Americans and Jobs: The Challenge and the Promise, 
ECON. POL’Y INST. 3 (Dec. 17, 2013), https://www.epi.org/files/2013/NATIVE-
AMERICANS-AND-JOBS-The-Challenge-and-the-Promise.pdf. 
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those of white Americans.37 Even when controlling for factors like age, 
sex, education level, and state of residence, Native Americans are 31% 
less likely to be employed than white people.38 The figures are even worse 
for Native Americans living on reservations. In 2005, the average 
unemployment rate for Native Americans on or near reservations was 
49%.39 Facing serious economic hardship, remotely located tribes have 
increasingly turned to e-commerce as a source of revenue.40 
This is where payday lending companies come in, providing tribes 
the investment capital to start online payday businesses. In exchange, these 
businesses receive tribal sovereign immunity from their association with 
the tribe,41 which they can use to sidestep state regulation for a greater 
profit.42  Some commentators call these arrangements “rent-a-tribe” 
schemes,43 which have become so popular that one can find several online 
consulting companies claiming to be expert in the process.44  In its best 
iteration, a tribal lending entity (“TLE”) will maintain offices on tribal 
lands, operate its computer servers there, and employ tribal personnel.45 
Generally, though, TLEs use many non-tribal subcontractors;46 and 
because outside companies finance the entire enterprise, nearly all of the 
revenues from the entities flow to them and not the tribe.47 To give one 
example, Adrian Rubin, an owner of multiple payday companies, agreed 
to send a relatively small monthly commission to an unnamed tribe in 
California on the condition that it pretend to own and operate the lending 
 
37 Id.  
38 Id. 
39 Jenadee Nanini, Note, Tribal Sovereignty and Fintech Regulations: The Future 
of Co-Regulating in Indian Country, 1 GEO. LAW. TECH. REV. 503, 504 n.6 (citing 
COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW, § 21.04 (Nell Jessup Newton ed., 
2015)). 
40 Id. at 504. 
41 See Heather L. Petrovich, supra note 9, at 341–45; Hilary Miller, The Future of 
Tribal Lending Under the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, BUS. L. 
TODAY (2013), https://perma.cc/XF2Z-ES3C (detailing the legal risks and 
benefits of tribal lending models). 
42 See Paul Walsh and Neal St. Anthony, State bars internet lender, wins $11.7M 
settlement over ‘rent a tribe’ loans, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 18, 2016), 
https://perma.cc/53GT-P97J. 
43 See Petrovich, supra note 9, at 341–45; see also Ben McLannahan, US 
authorities in crackdown on “rent-a-tribe” payday lenders, FIN. TIMES (June 28, 
2015), https://www.ft.com/content/82ca6198-1dc3-11e5-aa5a-398b2169cf79. 
44 See, e.g., LEANING ROCK FIN., https://www.consultants4tribes.com/leaning-
rock-finance/ 
 (last visited Apr. 5, 2020). 
45 Miller, supra note 41.  
46 Id. 
47 Id.; Petrovich, supra note 9, at 342–43.  
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companies and claim tribal immunity if anyone alleged state law 
violations.48 The Justice Department eventually tried and convicted Rubin 
on RICO,49 conspiracy, and mail fraud charges.50 No one knows how many 
other online payday lenders are engaging in bad faith “rent-a-tribe” 
schemes akin to Rubin’s because tribal sovereign immunity can bar state 
suits before robust discovery takes place, and the lessened disclosure 
requirements for corporations chartered under tribal law limit what 
discovery can ultimately reveal.51 A recent surge of RICO complaints 
alleging that many online lenders are “renting” tribes may indicate that the 
practice is common.52 
II. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND REGULATION 
 This section will describe the legal doctrines granting Internet 
TLEs immunity, as well as state and federal regulation of payday lending. 
The Marshall Court recognized Native American tribes as quasi-
sovereigns entitled to immunity in the early 19th century, and this 
recognition prompted the United States Supreme Court to begin to 
announce robust protections for Native American tribes in the middle of 
the 20th century. Lower federal and state courts have also developed legal 
standards for tribal sovereign immunity, most notably the arm of the tribe 
analysis. States—with limited success—have tried to regulate payday 
lending with usury laws, while the federal government has not enacted any 
comprehensive regulation.  
A. The Supreme Court Doctrine 
 Sovereign immunity is a federal common law principle that 
precludes sovereign governments from being sued without their consent, 
except in very narrow circumstances.53 Lacking a clear textual basis in the 
Constitution, sovereign immunity emanates from the inherent powers of 
 
48 Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Co-Conspirator of Reputed “Godfather of 
Payday Lending” Sentenced to Prison and Ordered to Forfeit $9,621,800 (Aug. 7, 
2018) [hereinafter DOJ Press Release]. 
49 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (1970).  
50 DOJ Press Release, supra note 48. 
51 See Petrovich, supra note 9, at 343–44. 
52 See, e.g., Hengle v. Curry, No. 3:18-cv-100, 2018 U.S. Dist. WL 3016289 (E. 
D. Va. June 15, 2018); Gibbs v. Stinson, 421 F. Supp. 3d 267 (E. D. Va. 2019); 
Brice v. Plain Green, LLC., 372 F. Supp. 3d 955 (N.D. Cal. 2019). 
53 Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign 
Immunity Under Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a 
Fundamental Aspect of American Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 662 
(2002).  
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sovereignty.54 The Supreme Court first recognized the federal 
government’s immunity from nonconsensual suits in 1821,55 and since 
then the doctrine has become firmly established in the Court’s 
jurisprudence.56 In addition to the federal government, state governments57 
and  foreign governments58 enjoy sovereign immunity in American courts. 
Congress has waived federal59 and foreign sovereign immunity in some 
instances,60 while the Court has developed several exceptions to state 
sovereign immunity in its case law.61 
 As “‘domestic dependent nations’ that exercise inherent 
sovereign authority over their members and territories,” Native American 
tribes also enjoy sovereign immunity from suit.62 The Marshall Court first 
recognized tribes as “independent nations” possessing “absolute 
sovereignty” in Johnson v. M’Intosh, but allowed the discovery doctrine 
to undermine tribes’ property interests nevertheless.63 Eight years later, in 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, the Court held that tribes were “domestic 
dependent nations,” a status which deprived the Cherokee tribe of diversity 
jurisdiction afforded to “foreign state[s]” under the Constitution.64 The 
Court continued to refine its jurisprudence in Worcester v. Georgia, in 
which it ruled that members of the Cherokee Nation could not be 
prosecuted under a Georgia statute.65 It explained that the Cherokee 
Nation’s sovereign status meant that “the laws of Georgia [could] have no 
force” in Cherokee territory, and that only Congress could regulate “the 
 
54 See, e.g., Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890) (citing THE FEDERALIST NO 
81. (Alexander Hamilton)).  
55 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 411–12 (1821).  
56 See generally Seisltad, supra note 53 (detailing the doctrinal history of tribal 
immunity in the Supreme Court). 
57 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712–13 (1999). 
58 Samantar v. Yousuf, 560 U.S. 305, 311–13 (2010). 
59 See, e.g., Federal Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1946). 
60 See The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. § 1330 (1976). 
61 For example, under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and Scheuer v. 
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), plaintiffs can sue state officials in limited 
circumstances. 
62 Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 
505, 509 (1991) (citing Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 2 (1831)). 
63 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823). 
64 30 U.S. 1, 26–27 (1831). 
65 31 U.S. 515, 556–57, 559 (1832). The Court later abrogated Worcester in 
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 364 (2001), where it held that generally applicable 
state laws could apply to off-reservation conduct by tribal officials. 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 130 
 
intercourse between the United States and this nation.”66  It took until 1850 
for the Court to extend sovereign immunity to tribal officials.67 
 While the above cases laid the foundation for the tribal sovereign 
immunity doctrine, the Court officially recognized tribal sovereign 
immunity as a federal common law mainstay in 1940 in United States v. 
United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. (USF&G).68 The case arose after 
the United States leased lands to a coal company as a trustee for the 
Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations.69 When the lessee went into 
receivership, the United States sought to recover royalties on behalf of the 
tribes in a bankruptcy proceeding.70 The coal company responded with a 
cross-claim against the tribes.71  
The Court held that the coal company could not file its cross-
claim. In keeping with its other holdings, the Court reiterated that Native 
American tribes are immune from suit absent Congressional authorization 
or their own waiver.72 The Chickasaw and Choctaw Nations did not waive 
their immunity from suit when they filed for bankruptcy in a federal 
tribunal, either, because their sovereign immunity could not depend on the 
jurisdiction in which their debtors resided.73 Tribes’ “unusual 
governmental organization and peculiar problems” made this reasoning 
“particularly applicable” to their circumstances.74 Harkening back to tribal 
sovereign immunity’s foundations, the Court cited Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia for the “public policy” goal that dependent sovereigns like tribal 
nations are exempt from suit.75 Effective protection of Cherokee Nation v. 
Georgia’s “public policy” required cross-claims to be as ineffective as 
direct suits.76  
In the decades following USF&G, the Court consistently 
reaffirmed that Native American tribes possess robust sovereign immunity 
protections. It has held that corporations can be entitled to a tribe’s 
 
66 Worcester, 31 U.S. at 561.  
67 See Parks v. Ross, 52 U.S. 362, 374–75 (1850). 
68 309 U.S. 506, 512–13 (1940). 
69 Id. at 510–11. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 512 (“It is as though the immunity which was theirs as sovereigns passed 
to the United States for their benefit, as their tribal properties did.”).  
73 Id. at 513 (“The sovereignty possessing immunity should not be compelled to 
defend against cross-actions away from its own territory or in courts, not of its 
own choice, merely because its debtor was unavailable except outside the 
jurisdiction of the sovereign’s consent.”).  
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 512–13. 
76 Id. 
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sovereign immunity.77 It prevented enforcement of state fishing laws78 and 
the Indian Civil Rights Act against tribes.79 It has barred states from 
enforcing lawful tax provisions for on-reservation transactions.80 Most 
relevant to online payday lenders, the Court held in Kiowa Tribe of 
Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies that sovereign immunity 
protected tribes governmental and commercial activities, on- and off-
reservation.81 Now, 80 years after UFS&G,  the broad rule is that Native 
American tribes will enjoy sovereign immunity unless the tribe explicitly 
waives its immunity or Congress abrogates it.82 
B. Arm of the Tribe Tests 
 Although the Supreme Court has provided plenty of case law on 
when sovereign immunity protects Native Americans tribes, it has not 
spoken on how to determine when this immunity applies to tribes’ business 
entities.83 This question is especially relevant for tribally-affiliated online 
lenders; its answer determines whether they will face legal culpability in 
many instances. Some state and federal appellate courts developed “arm 
of the tribe” tests to fill the vacuum the Supreme Court has left. These 
tests, broadly speaking, ask whether the business entity in question is truly 
a functionary of the tribe and not merely a third-party company employing 
something like a “rent-a-tribe” scheme.  
For example, the Colorado Supreme Court in 2010 came out with 
a three-factor arm of the tribe test, in which it evaluated “(1) whether the 
tribes created the entities pursuant to tribal law; (2) whether the tribes own 
and operate the entities; and (3) whether the entities’ immunity protects 
the tribes’ sovereignty.”84 In 2016, the California Supreme Court 
announced a five-factor test which considers “(1) the entity’s method of 
creation, 2) whether the tribe intended the entity to share in its immunity, 
(3) the entity’s purpose, (4) the tribe’s control over the entity; and (5) the 
financial relationship between the tribe and the entity.”85 California’s test 
originated in the Tenth Circuit in Breakthrough Management Group, Inc. 
 
77 538 U.S. at 705 n.1 (2003). 
78 Puyallup Tribe, Inc., v. Dep’t of Game, 433 U.S. 165, 173 (1977). 
79 Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59 (1978). 
80 Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band of Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 
U.S. 505, 514, (1991). 
81 523 U.S. 751, 760 (1998). 
82 Id. at 759–60. 
83 Petrovich, supra note 9, at 335. 
84 Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. Colorado ex rel. Suthers, 242 P.3d 
1099, 1102 (Colo. 2010). 
85 People v. Miami Nation Enters., 2 Cal. 5th 222, 244 (Cal. 2016). 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 132 
 
v. Chukchansi Gold Casino & Resort.86 Other circuits have found 
Breakthrough’s analysis convincing and adopted its factors, too.87 The 
California Supreme Court left out Breakthrough’s sixth factor—whether 
“the policies underlying tribal sovereign immunity and its connection to 
tribal economic development . . . are served by granting immunity to the 
economic entities”88—because it believed that the first five factors 
“properly account[ed] for” these considerations.89  
 The two state tests differ in that California considers the entity’s 
purpose and the financial link between the tribe and lender90 whereas 
Colorado does not.91 The discrepancies in different states’ tests means that 
tribal lending entities will be entitled to sovereign immunity in some states 
but not others.92 The California and Colorado cases above reflect this 
phenomenon: lending entities associated with the Miami Tribe of 
Oklahoma and the Santee Sioux Nation were being sued in both decisions, 
yet only in Colorado were they afforded tribal sovereign immunity.93 The 
possibility of variation like this has prompted some to call for 
comprehensive action from Congress.94 
 
86 629 F.3d 1173, 1191 (10th Cir. 2010). Just this year, the Arizona Supreme Court 
adopted all six of the Breakthrough factors in Hwal’Bay Ba: J Enters., Inc. v. 
Jantzen, No. CV-19-0123-PR, 2020 Ariz. LEXIS 64 at *15 (Feb. 24, 2020). 
87 White v. Univ. of California, 765 F.3d 1010, 1025 (9th Cir. 2014); Williams v. 
Big Picture Loans, LLC, 929 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2019). 
88 Breakthrough, 629 F.3d at 1191. 
89 Miami Nation Enters., 2 Cal. 5th at 244. This discussion should contextualize 
the “Our Business” section on Big Picture Loans’ website. The page says that the 
company’s purpose is to “enhance the Tribe’s self-determination and further 
diversify the Tribe’s economy”; that it was formed under tribal law; and that it is 
located on reservation. These statements are best read as attempts to fulfill 
Breakthrough factors (6), (1), and possibly (4), respectively. About Us, BIG 
PICTURE LOANS, http://www.bigpictureloans.com/about-us (last visited Apr. 7, 
2020). 
90 Miami Nation Enters., 2 Cal. 5th at 244. 
91 Cash Advance & Preferred Cash Loans v. Colorado ex rel. Suthers, 242 P.3d 
1099, 1102 (Colo. 2010). 
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C. State Regulation 
States generally attempt to regulate payday lenders with usury 
laws.95 These laws cap the amount of money lenders can give out, set 
limits on their interest rates, and limit the length of loans’ terms.96 Some 
regulations even specify the number of loans someone can have 
outstanding and the number of times loans may be rolled over.97 Loan caps 
range from $300 to $50,000, while loan term limits span from less than 
two weeks to 60 days.98 Interest rate caps vary substantially.99 Instead of 
regulating payday lenders’ practices, Arizona, Arkansas, Georgia, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia have chosen to ban them entirely.100  
Although these laws appear robust and straightforward, payday 
lenders find many ways to avoid them, and not just by claiming tribal 
immunity. Indeed, a 2016 report by the Democrats on the House Financial 
Services Committee found that payday lenders disguise themselves as 
different financial services providers, give out loans under mortgage 
lending statutes, abuse loopholes, and ignore laws entirely when 
distributing loans online.101 Lenders also form shell companies to hide 
their businesses from regulators.102 Tribal immunity presents its own set 
of problems, too. Because payday lenders make tribal immunity claims at 
the pleading stage, courts can dismiss state regulatory enforcement cases 
before they go to discovery.103 And because states bear the burden of 
proving that lenders are not entitled to immunity, states must argue that 
lenders are not arms of the tribe without the useful information full 
discovery can provide.104 Courts do allow a limited amount of discovery 
before these motions, but how helpful that is to state regulators is 
questionable.105 These problems have lead some state regulators to give up 
 
95 Heather Morton, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Payday Lending 






100 Grace Austin, What Happens When Payday Loans Are Outlawed? (Dec. 11, 
2018), https://www.opploans.com/payday-news/what-happens-when-payday- 
loans-are-outlawed/ (last visited Oct. 30, 2020).  
101 STAFF OF H. COMM. ON FIN. SERVS., 114TH CONG., SKIRTING THE LAW: FIVE 
TACTICS PAYDAY LENDERS USE TO EVADE STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS 
5–6 (Comm. Print 2016). 
102 Petrovich, supra note 9, at 345. 
103 Id. at 343–44.  
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 134 
 
enforcing state laws against tribal lending entities entirely,106 and the small 
number of state cases on the matter may reflect state regulators’ hesitance 
to bring enforcement actions.107 In 2016, the California Supreme Court 
granted relief after the state successfully brought suit against tribally 
affiliated lenders,108 but remains the only state supreme court to allow 
regulatory action to proceed against tribally-affiliated lenders pleading 
tribal sovereign immunity for on-reservation activity. 
D. Federal Regulation 
Congress has not passed a comprehensive statute regulating online 
payday lenders.109 A Senate bill that would cap interest rates at 36% 
remains stuck in committee.110 The Supreme Court has made clear that 
Congress can waive tribal sovereign immunity.111 Whether it will, though, 
is a different question. The payday lobby is reportedly quite influential in 
Congress,112 as are some Native American industry lobbies.113 With the 
Consumer Financial and Protection Bureau set to withdraw proposed rules 
regulating payday lenders,114 sweeping federal regulation appears 
unlikely. 
That is not to say there has been no federal action, however. 
Notably, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has brought suit against 
online lenders115 seeking to enforce § 5 of the Federal Trade Commission 
Act (FTCA).116 Section  5 prohibits “unfair or deceptive” practices in or 
affecting interstate commerce.117 For example, in a 2016 case, the FTC 
secured a $25.5 million settlement against several lenders who violated § 
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5 by charging borrowers undisclosed and inflated fees.118 As a generally 
applicable federal law, the FTCA presumptively applies to tribally-
affiliated lenders,119 so the FTC can bring § 5 actions without having to 
clear the tribal immunity bar. Having said that, the FTC still must operate 
within its statutory mandates; it cannot enforce state laws nor can it bring 
actions that Congress has not authorized.120 This makes FTC enforcement 
a powerful, but circumscribed tool for regulating tribal lenders. 
III. GINGRAS: A NEW WAY FORWARD? 
 Much of this Note has detailed the problems state regulators and 
consumers who want to take action against TLEs face. Indeed, tribal 
immunity is a robust protection and difficult to nullify at the pleading 
stage, making state regulatory efforts useless against many TLEs. Gingras 
v. Think Finance, Inc.121 may signal that this dynamic is over. There, the 
Second Circuit allowed an injunctive suit, based on state law, to proceed 
beyond the pleading stage against employees of a TLE.122 In so holding, it 
joined the Eleventh Circuit123 in concluding that tribal sovereign immunity 
does not bar state law injunctive suits against tribal officials or 
employees.124 This decision could prove a winning countermeasure for 
plaintiffs seeking to vindicate state law claims against TLEs claiming 
tribal sovereign immunity.  
 The Gingras plaintiffs borrowed money from Plain Green, an 
online payday lender owned by the Chippewa Cree Tribe of the Rocky 
Boy’s Indian Reservation in Montana.125 Plaintiffs, residents of Vermont, 
sought an injunction against some of Plain Green’s officers for violating 
state and federal law after the Plaintiffs failed to pay back some of their 
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loans.126 Their complaint alleged that Plain Green’s interest rates exceeded 
the caps imposed by Vermont law.127 The complaint also alleged that 
Think Finance, which Plain Green employed to service their loan, 
orchestrated a rent-a-tribe scheme with the Chippewa Tribe designed to 
circumvent state and federal lending laws.128  The defendants moved to 
dismiss plaintiffs’ suit, arguing that their status as an “arm of the tribe” 
entitled them to tribal sovereign immunity.129 The district court denied the 
motion, which the defendants appealed to the Second Circuit.130 
 The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial.131  The 
court decided that it did not have to determine whether the defendants were 
arms of the Chippewa Tribe, because the Supreme Court case Michigan v. 
Bay Mills Indian Community132 condoned injunctive suits, based on state 
law, against tribal officials or employees.133 Therefore, the plaintiffs’ suit 
would be valid regardless of the defendants’ entitlement to tribal sovereign 
immunity. Similarly, in Bay Mills, the Supreme Court held that the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act134 did not abrogate tribal sovereign immunity 
from a state’s suit to enjoin off-reservation gaming, and thus Michigan 
could not bring suit against the Bay Mills Indian Community for opening 
up a casino off tribal lands.135 The Court suggested, however, that 
“Michigan could bring suit against tribal officials or employees (rather 
than the tribe itself) for, say, gambling without a license.”136 Under an 
analogy to Ex parte Young,137 explained the Court, “tribal immunity does 
not bar such suit[s] for injunctive relief against individuals, including tribal 
officers, responsible for unlawful conduct.”138 This “panoply of tools” 
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meant that the Court’s holding on the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act did 
not leave Michigan and other states without recourse to enforce their laws 
against tribal entities.139 
 The Second Circuit concluded that the Court’s language endorsed 
plaintiffs’ state law claims and rejected the defendants’ arguments to the 
contrary.140 The defendants first tried arguing that Bay Mills’ key language 
was only dicta and accidentally overturned the Court’s holding in 
Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman.141 There, the Court 
declined to extend the Ex parte Young doctrine to suits against state 
officials violating state law, because those suits did not vindicate the 
supremacy of federal law and invaded state sovereignty.142 In the Second 
Circuit’s mind, however, the suit at bar did not implicate the concerns 
about sovereignty animating Pennhurst.143 Principles of sovereignty 
prevent federal courts from instructing a state official how to follow state 
law or a tribal official how to follow tribal law; those principles do not 
apply to compelling a tribal official to follow state or federal law.144 The 
defendants also tried arguing that Bay Mills applied to only individual 
capacity, as opposed to official capacity, suits against tribal officials or 
employees violating state law.145 The court declined to accept “such a 
cramped reading,” instead interpreting Bay Mills as distinguishing only 
between tribal officials, employees, and the tribe itself.146 Last, the 
defendants contended that Bay Mills authorized only Ex parte Young-like 
suits against tribal official or employees by states themselves, but the 
Second Circuit found nothing in the case law foreclosing those suits based 
on the identity of the plaintiff.147 
 Gingras could be a sign of things to come for TLEs violating state 
law. Especially significant is that the Second Circuit did not even address 
the arm of the tribe question,148 which, as this Note has discussed, 
frustrated past state regulatory efforts. Under Gingras, state and consumer 
plaintiffs would no longer be forced to argue against motions to dismiss 
with one hand tied behind their back; instead, plaintiffs can avoid the 
question of sovereign immunity and proceed directly to the merits. And 
without the benefit of presumptive tribal sovereign immunity, online 
 
139 Id. 
140 Gingras, 922 F.3d at 121–22. 
141 Id. at 122; 465 U.S. 89 (1984).  
142 Pennhurst, 465 U.S. at 106.  
143 Gingras, 922 F.3d at 122. 
144 Id. at 122–23. 
145 Id. at 123. 
146 Id. 
147 See id. at 123–24. 
148 Id. at 120–21. 
No. 1] DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW 138 
 
payday lenders will not be able to violate state law with impunity. The 
Second Circuit appeared to be aware that tribal sovereign immunity had 
been abused by payday lenders in the past, and that their decision could 
help put an end to it, observing, “[a]bsent this mechanism for a state to 
enforce its laws against out-of-state tribal officials, the state and its citizens 
would seemingly be without recourse.”149 Indeed, Gingras and its 
reasoning provide state and individual plaintiffs the opportunity to hold 
online payday lenders accountable for violating state law and ensnaring 
unwitting borrowers in the “debt trap.” Hopefully, the “recourse” the 
Second Circuit furnished will help minimize the significant financial risks 
online payday lenders pose to borrowers. 
CONCLUSION 
 Without comprehensive federal regulation, states and consumers 
have struggled to pursue legal remedies against Internet TLEs. For a while 
it appeared that tribal sovereign immunity could overcome almost any 
state regulatory effort, leaving plaintiffs “without recourse” to vindicate 
state law claims. Gingras could portend better things for plaintiffs. Under 
Gingras, states and consumers may finally be able to seek “recourse” in 
the federal courts. The availability of federal forums should mean that 
Internet TLEs and their employees will feel more compelled to respect 
state law, or else face injunctive suit in federal court. Indeed, if other 
circuits adopt the Second Circuit’s reading of Bay Mills, it will be that 
rent-a-tribe schemes who are violating state law without effective answers, 
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